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We briefly introduce the financial crisis and the role played by
mortgage-backed securities. Then we describe the controversy at issue:
whether, in order to own and enforce the mortgage loans backing those
securities, a special-purpose vehicle “purchasing” mortgage loans must take
physical delivery of the notes and security instruments in the precise manner
specified by the sale agreement. Focusing on this controversy, we analyze
(i) the extent, if any, that the controversy has merit; (ii) whether in-house
counsel should have anticipated the controversy; and (iii) what, if anything,
in-house counsel could have done to avert or, after it arose, to mitigate the
controversy. Finally, we examine how the foregoing analysis can help to
inform the broader issue of how in-house counsel should address complex
legal transactions.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article examines how in-house counsel should address
complex legal transactions by examining their role in the structuring of
mortgage-backed securitization transactions. In that context, the Article
also touches on the professional responsibility of in-house counsel in
generally dealing with matters of legal risk. The Article begins by
discussing mortgage-backed securities in the context of the recent
financial crisis.
I. THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY MBS
The 2008 financial crisis is closely tied to the securitization of
subprime, or risky, residential mortgage loans.1 Securitization refers to
a category of financing transactions in which lenders sell rights to
payment under mortgage loans, accounts receivable, lease rentals, and
other types of income-producing “financial assets” to a trust or other
special-purpose vehicle (an “SPV,” sometimes interchangeably called a
special-purpose entity or SPE). The goal is to separate the financial
assets from the risks generally associated with the original lender—
usually called the “originator” to distinguish it from the SPV. The SPV
issues securities (usually called mortgage-backed securities, or “MBS,”
when the SPV’s financial assets consist of mortgage loans) to capital
market investors, using the proceeds to pay the purchase price of the
financial assets. This funds the originator at a lower cost than if it had
borrowed the money from a bank or other financial intermediary.2
Prior to the financial crisis, securitization transactions were
sometimes backed, at least in part, by subprime residential mortgage
loans. Because home prices had generally been increasing in the United
States since the Great Depression, the expectation was that continuing
home-price appreciation would enable even risky borrowers to repay
their loans by refinancing their houses. But this model failed when, in
2007 and 2008, home prices fell significantly. Subprime borrowers,
who were relying on refinancing for loan repayment, could not
refinance. Furthermore, many subprime mortgage loans had adjustable
1.
A mortgage loan is a right to payment evidenced by a promissory note
signed by the borrower, where the note is secured by the lien of a mortgage. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1020 (9th ed. 2009). The term “mortgage” is used in this Article to
include any security interest in real property supporting the note, including deeds of
trust and deeds to secure debt in addition to mortgages.
2.
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION §§ 1:1, 1:3 (Adam D. Ford ed., 3d ed. 2010).
Investors in the securities expect to ultimately be paid from collections on those
financial assets.
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rates that increased after an initial “teaser” period. Borrowers who
could not afford the rate increases had expected to refinance at lower
interest rates. That likewise was stymied by collapsing home prices.
For these reasons, risky borrowers began defaulting, ultimately
impairing payment on the securities. Investors started losing
confidence, and the price of MBS plummeted. With the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, the loss of confidence extended beyond MBS,
causing a broader debt crisis and impacting the real economy.3
II. THE A-B-C-D ARGUMENT
It has been repeatedly argued in financial and consumer blogs, at
seminars, and, recently, in the mainstream press that residential
mortgage-backed securities may be “non-mortgage-backed” securities
due to failure to comply with contractual requirements of sale.4
According to these arguments, the law requires that the SPV purchasing
the mortgage loans5 not only must have a signed contract of sale for
those loans but also must take physical delivery of the promissory notes
evidencing those loans (hereinafter, “notes”) in the precise manner

3.
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60
S.C. L. REV. 549, 550–53 (2009).
4.
See, e.g., Linda Beale, The Mortgage Loan Foreclosure Mess: Yves
Smith on the Banks' Gluttony; Problems with MERS and Sloppy Securitizations,
ATAXINGMATTER (Nov. 1, 2010), http://ataxingmatter.blogs.com/tax/2010/11/yvessmith-on-the-banks-gluttony.html; Adam Levitin, The Big Fail, CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 22,
2010,
2:50
PM),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/11/securitizationfail.html; Yves Smith, Op-Ed, How the Banks Put the Economy Underwater, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/opinion/31smith.html.
One argument often advanced is that such transfers also fail to comply with legal
requirements of sale, as most of the terms of the UCC may be modified by agreement
of the parties. See U.C.C. § 1-302 (2001); see also N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 1-205
(McKinney 2001). But this simply makes the UCC equivalent to the parties’ contract
(the sale agreement) and is therefore equivalent to failure to comply with contractual
requirements. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
N.B.: While Article 9 of the UCC is indeed uniform in relevant part, the other
articles (in particular, Articles 1 and 3) vary among states. For example, New York’s
version of the UCC does not contain § 1-302, and its version of Article 3 dates back to
the 1950s. N.Y. U.C.C. LAW (McKinney 2001). As most of the sales agreements used
in securitizations are governed by New York law, this distinction may be important,
though we believe that subsequent revisions of the UCC probably often reflect rather
than change pre-existing common law and therefore may be good common law in New
York. Our citations to the UCC itself are to the current version published by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; references to
individual states’ versions are cited as such.
5.
This Article does not address the extent, if any, to which that argument
might apply to other types of financial assets.
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specified by the sale agreement.6 As the result of the multiple sales
agreements involved in a typical mortgage securitization, in which the
loans are typically sold by A to B, by B to C, and by C to D (where A
is the originator, D the SPV, and B and C intervening parties), this is
often called the “A-B-C-D” or alphabet argument.7 We adopt that
terminology in this Article.
If physical delivery of the notes were not taken in exactly the
manner specified by the sale agreement, advocates of the A-B-C-D
argument contend that the SPV would not own and therefore could not
enforce the mortgage loans.8 The mortgage loans would then revert to
the originator, which would then have an obligation to refund the

6.
This Article does not address the scenario where, as often, the SPV is a
New York trust. In that scenario, some argue that the SPV must also take physical
delivery of the notes and security instruments, even if physical delivery is not required
by the contract or applicable law (other than New York trust law). New York trust law
is based, however, on gratuitous trusts (i.e., the law of gifts), which requires delivery
of the gift because there is no consideration. Therefore, logically, this requirement of
New York trust law should not apply to a commercial trust such as an SPV. See N.Y.
C.P.L.R § 7-1.18 (Mckinney 2011) (providing that transfers to a lifetime trust are “not
accomplished by recital of assignment, holding or receipt in the trust instrument”);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1-2.20 (Mckinney 2011) (excluding business and investment trusts
from the definition of “lifetime trust”); see also N. Wooten, 2010 11 12 Memo on NY
Trust Law and Delivery Issues (Nov. 12, 2010) (unpublished) (on file with author)
(citing only cases involving gifts and transfers without consideration in support of the
proposition that physical delivery is required to complete the transfer of notes and
mortgages to a New York trust while acknowledging that assignment may constitute
delivery).
7.
There is an ancillary argument to the A-B-C-D argument: that not only the
notes but also the mortgages securing the notes must be transferred. This ancillary
argument is much weaker than the A-B-C-D argument because, in most (if not all)
states, it is clear that collateral follows the debt it secures. See, e.g., Carpenter v.
Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872) (“The note and mortgage are inseparable . . .. An
assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter
alone is a nullity.”). The UCC codified this common law rule. U.C.C. § 9-203(g)
(1998) (“The attachment of a security interest in a right to payment . . .secured by a
. . .lien on . . .real property is also attachment of a security interest in the
. . .mortgage, or other lien.”); see also PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF.
COMMERCIAL CODE, APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED
ISSUES RELATING TO MORTGAGE NOTES 12 (2011), available at http://
www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Committees_Materials/PEBUCC/PEB_Report_111311.p
df (confirming same). Our Article will therefore focus solely on the A-B-C-D
argument.
8.
Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 19
(2010) (statement of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor, Georgetown University
Law Center) [hereinafter Levitin Statement]. This might be viewed as a type of
transactional law failure (i.e., a failure to comply with law or contract in connection
with a business transaction, as compared, for example, to other types of failures such as
accounting failures, ultra vires-type failures, and violation-of-law failures).
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purchase price paid by the MBS investors, plus interest, less any
distributions on the mortgage loans.9
Such a reversion would create chaos. It would be difficult if not
impossible to calculate and allocate the refund payments, and few
originators would have the wherewithal to pay such refunds. Indeed,
many if not most originators of subprime mortgage loans are now
insolvent or close to insolvency.10 In cases where the originator no
longer exists and its obligations have not been assumed by a successor,
ownership of the mortgage loans would become unclear, clouding title
not only to those loans but also possibly to the underlying property.
Such a failure to transfer the mortgage loans to the SPV would
also create serious tax issues, even if they were subsequently
transferred in accordance with the A-B-C-D argument to cure the
ownership issue. The SPV would not qualify for the entity-level tax
exemption as a real estate mortgage investment conduit (REMIC) if it
failed to gain ownership of the mortgage loans at or within ninety days
of closing.11 Absent another exemption from taxation, the SPV would
then be subject to an entity-level tax, which would reduce net payments
to investors in its securities. In the case of transfers of mortgage loans
more than ninety days after closing, there would be a tax of one
hundred percent of the value of the transferred assets.12
In a related but distinct argument, even if the SPV (or its agent,
such as a servicer) owned and had possession of the notes, proponents
of the A-B-C-D argument contend that the SPV could not enforce the
mortgage loans unless the notes were indorsed in the precise manner
specified by the sale agreement. Their rationale is that notes that are not
indorsed in accordance with the sale agreement should be presumed to

9.
10.

Id. at 20.

Worth Civilis & Mark Gongloff, Subprime Shakeout: Lenders that Have
Closed Shop, Been Acquired or Stopped Loans, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, http://
online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-subprimeloans0706-sort.html#top (last
visited Nov. 2, 2011).
11.
See Scot J. Paltrow, IRS Weighs Tax Penalties on Mortgage Securities,
REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-usa-mbstaxes-idUSTRE73Q7UX20110427 (discussing potential REMIC violations and
contrasting the views of James Peaslee and Adam Levitin on whether the Internal
Revenue Service will pursue enforcement of alleged REMIC violations).
12.
Id. The A-B-C-D argument maintains that the mortgage loans have not
been transferred and, apparently alternatively, that the notes (rather than the mortgage
loans) are the actual assets and therefore cannot be delivered more than ninety days
after closing; that would render the SPV unable to cure its ineligibility for REMIC
treatment (and, indeed, its lack of ownership of any assets). See Adam J. Levitin &
Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 14 n.35 (2011).
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be fraudulent.13 Moreover, if the notes are indorsed to a servicer or
other collection agent rather than to the SPV, proponents of the A-B-CD argument contend that the indorsee is not a real party in interest and
therefore should not be able to enforce the notes. We view this as an
evidentiary issue based on the procedures that were (or were not)
followed in transferring an individual loan, rather than a structural
argument that the SPV does not own the mortgage loans at all. As such,
this evidentiary issue may well have merit in particular cases.14
In this Article, we first analyze the merits of the A-B-C-D
argument. We then analyze whether in-house counsel of clients that
structure or invest in mortgage-securitization transactions should have
anticipated the controversy spurred by that argument. Thereafter, we
analyze what, if anything, in-house counsel could have done to avert—
or, after it arose, to mitigate—the controversy. Finally, we examine
how the foregoing analyses can help inform the broader issue of how
in-house counsel should address complex legal transactions.
III. ANALYSIS

A. The Process of Transferring Mortgage Loans into SPVs
To understand the merits of the A-B-C-D argument, one needs to
first understand the process by which mortgage loans are transferred to
SPVs. In securitization transactions, the transfer occurs pursuant to
contracts variously known as pooling and servicing agreements (usually
referred to as PSAs), sale and servicing agreements, mortgage loan
purchase agreements, and the like. Because the contract (following
standard legal definitions) defines the mortgage loan to include the note

13.
See, e.g., Yves Smith, 4ClosureFraud Posts Lender Processing Services
Mortgage Document Fabrication Price Sheet, NAKED CAPITALISM (Oct. 3, 2010, 12:01

AM),
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/10/4closurefraud-posts-docx-mortgagedocument-fabrication-price-sheet.html (suggesting that the failure to establish proper
chains of endorsement led some financial firms to turn to forgeries and other fraudulent
methods to establish their right to foreclose on mortgages).
14.
See, e.g., Kemp v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Kemp), 440
B.R. 624, 628–29 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2010), (finding that the debtor’s note was never
transferred from Countrywide to Bank of New York, which had filed a proof of claim
against the debtor for the note); U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n v. Ibanez, No. SJC 10694
(Mass. Jan. 7, 2011); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Francis, No. 50423(U), slip
op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 25, 2011) (dismissing foreclosure action with prejudice
because plaintiff could not demonstrate that it owned the mortgage and note when it
initiated the foreclosure action).
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and the mortgage, the sale of the mortgage loan includes the sale of the
note and the mortgage.15
The A-B-C-D argument pertains primarily to mortgagesecuritization transactions entered into since 2001. Uniformly effective
July 1, 2001, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was
amended to govern the sale of promissory notes16 and to provide that
their sale—which would include the sale of any collateral (such as
mortgages) securing the notes17—could be effected merely by the seller
signing a sale agreement describing the notes, without indorsement or
delivery of the notes.18 The buyer would then automatically be
protected from most third-party claims.19
Nonetheless, because promissory notes traditionally have been
(and under the amended Article 9 continue to be)20 transferred by being
indorsed and physically delivered (and indeed Article 9 provides that
the rights of subsequent transferees of notes can sometimes trump the
rights of owners of the notes who do not actually hold them directly or
through an agent),21 parties to these contracts were concerned that the
SPV’s rights to the notes might become subordinate to the rights of
third parties who, for whatever reason, actually receive the indorsed
notes. In order to protect the SPV and its MBS investors, the contracts
15.
This is achieved through a sentence known as the Granting Clause, which
generally states that the originator sells, transfers, assigns, grants, and conveys to the
buyer all its right, title, and interest in and to the mortgage loans.
16.
U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (1998). Under this amendment, which was officially
proposed in 1998, the UCC also governs the sale of payment intangibles such as the
mortgage loans in the same manner as promissory notes. Although this both clarifies
and incorporates into law the longstanding practice of selling mortgage loans by
contract, we do not address this provision in our Article because the A-B-C-D argument
and the mortgage-note controversy consider only the notes. N.B.: Article 9 has
subsequently been revised, but those revisions have not been adopted by all relevant
jurisdictions, whereas the 1998 amendment has been enacted by all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Our citations refer to
the 1998 amendment that became effective in 2001 rather than the subsequent revisions
proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
17.
See U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 7 (1998).
18.
§ 9-203(b)(3)(A).
19.
See § 9-309(4) (providing that a sale of a promissory note is automatically
perfected); cf. infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing third-party claims
of certain purchasers).
20.
See § 9-203(b)(3)(B).
21.
Promissory notes are “instruments” under Article 9 and as such may be
“transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.” § 9-102(47);
§ 9-102(65) (defining a promissory note as an instrument). The sale of promissory
notes is also governed by § 9-109(a)(3). The rights of purchasers of promissory notes
who do not (directly or through an agent) take possession of the notes are subordinate,
however, to the rights of a purchaser of the notes who gives value and takes possession
of the notes in good faith and without notice of the prior ownership. § 9-330(d).
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therefore generally provided for delivery and indorsement of the notes
to the SPV or its agent. To this end, a typical contract would require
that “in connection with the sale,” the notes be delivered to the SPV (or
its agent, the document custodian), indorsed or assigned as specified by
the contracts. We will call this requirement the “delivery instructions.”
The delivery instructions also were intended to enable the SPV or
its agent to actually enforce the notes, where appropriate. State law
generally requires that any person seeking to enforce a promissory
note—and, by extension, foreclose on a mortgage securing the note—
must have physical possession of the note.22 As before, the delivery
instructions continue to safeguard the SPV’s interests.
Unfortunately, over the years procedural standards in mortgage
securitizations appear to have deteriorated along with loan-underwriting
standards. As a result, in some, if not many or most, cases, notes were
neither indorsed nor delivered to the SPV or its agent in accordance
with the delivery instructions.23 Moreover, it appears that mortgage
loan servicers seeking to enforce notes on behalf of the SPV did not
always bother to take physical possession of the notes in accordance
with state law.24
As home foreclosures skyrocketed, the consumer bar learned about
securitization of mortgage loans. They located securitization sales
agreements and parsed their provisions, reading the delivery
instructions as necessary to—rather than merely protective of—the sale
of the mortgage loans to the SPV (in other words, creating a
conditional rather than absolute sale of those loans).25 To this end, they
22.
See U.C.C. § 3-301 (1990) (specifying person entitled to enforce an
instrument); U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21) (2001) (defining “holder” as person in possession
of an instrument).
23.
See, e.g., Kathleen M. Howley, Foreclosure Errors Cloud
Homeownership with ‘Blighted Titles’, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 1, 2010, 5:35 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-01/foreclosure-errors-cloud-homeownership-withmillions-of-blighted-titles-.html.
24.
See infra note 77. Some mortgage servicers appear simply to have printed
photocopies of the note. Kate Berry, Robo-Signing Redux: Servicers Still Fabricating
Foreclosure Documents, AM. BANKER (Aug. 31, 2011, 5:47 PM), http://
www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_170/robo-signing-foreclosure-mortgageassignments-1041741-1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1.
Indorsement
or
assignment of those copies with the intent to enforce is now known as “robo-signing,” a
type of fraud. See id.
25.
See, e.g., Correia v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 452 B.R. 319, 321
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Debtors filed a complaint against Deutsche Bank (and
IndyMac) to set aside the foreclosure sale [of their home]. They alleged that the
purported assignments [of the mortgage] from IndyMac to Deutsche Bank were flawed
because they did not comply with the terms of the PSA. According to the Debtors, this
rendered them invalid.”); In re Samuels, 415 B.R. 8, 14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009)
(“[T]he Debtor contends that the PSA required that all mortgages acquired thereunder
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argued (among other things) that because the UCC may be varied by
agreement,26 the delivery instructions actually modified the UCC to
require that the notes must be indorsed and timely delivered to the SPV
or its agent in order for their sale to be effective and in order for the
SPV to have standing to enforce the notes.27

B. To What Extent, If Any, Does the A-B-C-D Argument Have Merit?
We believe that the A-B-C-D argument has little or no legal merit
with respect to the structure of mortgage securitizations. Under contract
law, the question is whether delivery instructions providing that, “in
connection with the sale,” the notes must be delivered to the SPV or its
agent indorsed as specified by the securitization contract requires such
delivery and indorsement in order for the sale to become effective. The
delivery instructions are not described as conditions to closing the
securitization transaction or to the sales thereunder, nor are escrows or
hold-backs established pending proof of satisfaction of the
instructions.28 Rather, those instructions appear to be intended to
protect the SPV and its investors, not to invalidate their rights if the
instructions were not complied with.29
We have already explained how commercial law, which is
governed by the UCC, enables the sale of the mortgage loans without
delivery and indorsement of the notes. The only remaining question—

had to be funneled to Deutsche Bank, as pool trustee, through the entity designated by
the PSA as ‘depositor,’ ARSI. A failure to follow this protocol . . .would, the Debtor
contends, constitute a breach of the PSA . . ..”); cf. Adam Levitin, Standing to Invoke
PSAs as a Foreclosure Defense, CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 4, 2011, 7:05 PM), http://
www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/07/standing-to-challenge-standing.html
(“Adherence to the PSA determines whether there was a transfer effected or not
because under NY trust law (which governs most PSAs), a transfer not in compliance
with a trust’s documents is void.” (emphasis omitted)).
26.
The UCC states that, with certain limitations, “the effect of provisions of
[the Uniform Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement.” U.C.C. § 1-302(a)
(2001).
27.
Levitin Statement, supra note 8, at 12. They also argued that any notes
indorsed in a manner that did not conform to the sales agreements were presumptively
invalid. Cf. Adam Levitin, Do We Have a Fraud Problem? The Case of the
Mysteriously Appearing Allonge, CREDIT SLIPS (Jun. 16, 2011, 8:43 PM), http://
www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/06/do-we-have-a-fraud-problem-the-case-of-themysteriously-appearing-allonge.html.
28.
See, e.g., Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2006-2, Current Report (Form
8-K) Ex. 10.1: PSA § 2.01 (May 12, 2006) (exemplifying common PSA terms for the
conveyance of mortgage notes). The delivery instructions still have independent force,
however, because their breach would enable the SPV to sue under the contractual
remedies for breach.
29.
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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whether the delivery instructions modified the UCC to require such
indorsement and delivery—is effectively one of contract interpretation,
which has already been answered.30
We next examine whether in-house counsel of clients structuring
or investing in mortgage-securitization transactions should have
anticipated and tried to avert the controversy over the A-B-C-D
argument—which for simplicity we will hereinafter refer to as the
“mortgage-note controversy.”

C. To What Extent, If Any, Should In-house Counsel Have Anticipated
and Tried to Avert the Mortgage-Note Controversy?
Observers generally recognize that in-house counsel are
particularly well situated to serve an anticipatory and preventive
function for their business clients.31 In contrast to outside counsel, who
typically are too costly to involve in the early stages of a transaction or
legal issue, in-house counsel are almost always present and can offer
legal advice early in the decision-making process.32 Also, because in30.
31.

See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
E.g., JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS

AND

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 195 (2006) (“[T]he inside counsel is uniquely positioned to
specialize in preventive law.”); Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate
Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 281 (1985) (“The general
counsel, as a part of senior management . . .has both the right and responsibility to
insist upon early legal involvement in major transactions that will raise significant legal
issues.”); Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs and
Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113, 1116 (1997) (“[T]oday’s general counsel
is much more concerned with forward-looking, systematic features of corporate law
compliance.”); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional
Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 519 (1989) (“As in the
management of outside counsel, in preventive law practice, corporations rely on inside
counsel to implement and determine corporate interests.”); Omari Scott Simmons &
James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the In-House Counsel Role, 41
SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 115 (2011) (explaining that in-house counsel possesses traits
“essential to practicing strategic preventive law”). Several significant judicial opinions
also suggest, without explicitly recognizing, a special preventive role for in-house
counsel. While considering the extent of attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the privilege exists to “encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). Additionally, in 2009 Delaware’s high
court explicitly held that corporate officers, including general counsel, owe fiduciary
duties to their corporation. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009).
32.
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 31, at 280; Simmons & Dinnage, supra note
31, at 115. In companies with small in-house legal departments, however, transactional
work may be outsourced to outside counsel even in the early stages of a transaction or
legal issue. That would limit in-house counsel’s oversight role. Email from Gabe
Shawn Varges to Steven L. Schwarcz (Jan. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Varges Email] (Gabe
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house counsel only serve a single client,33 they benefit from superior
information about that client’s organization, operations, and business
culture.34 This information is also “dynamic” in the sense that, at any
given time, in-house lawyers know whom in their company to contact
about an issue as well as the status of ongoing projects.35 Furthermore,
their knowledge of the law equips in-house counsel to educate corporate
employees about potential legal issues and avoid costly compliance
problems.36
A crucial qualifier must be added to the informational superiority
of in-house counsel: the information they receive from corporate
management is heavily dependent on the nature of their relationship
with such management. Lawyers who question business decisions too
often, or who seem overly cautious, risk being perceived as obstacles to
deal-making and are liable to be frozen out of information channels
within the organization.37 Thus, the theoretical information advantage
of an in-house lawyer can be constrained by the lawyer’s ability to
forge relationships within the company and even by the vicissitudes of
office politics.38 To be most effective, in-house counsel need to be—and
to be seen by their clients as—members of the corporate “team”:
working towards the same goals, even when their role on the “team”
seems to be in conflict with a business group’s particular wishes.
In-house counsel are also well-situated to guard the long-term
interests of the company against the possibly short-sighted behavior of
management. The interests of line personnel are not inherently opposed
to the long-term interests of their company; indeed, their interests are
obviously linked in many fundamental ways. However, compensation
Shawn Varges is an international lawyer who has held senior in-house legal and
compliance positions with companies in the United States and Europe).
33.
Albeit a complex client, generally speaking. Simmons & Dinnage, supra
note 31, at 111–12.
34.
Id. at 113–14.
35.
Id. at 114.
36.
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 31, at 284; Gruner, supra note 31, at 1157–
58. In-house counsel’s knowledge of both the law and their client-employer’s business
offers them a “dual competency,” magnifying the value of their advice and education
efforts. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 31, at 114, 117–18.
37.
See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and
Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 457, 471 (2000).
38.
See infra note 52 and accompanying text. This type of tension is one of
the reasons for the emergence of dedicated compliance departments in many companies.
Varges Email, supra note 32. On the emergence of compliance functions generally, see
Gabe Shawn Varges, The Compliance Side of International Legal Practice, in CAREERS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6, 6–8 (2003–04) [herinafter Vargas, Compliance Side]; Gabe
Shawn Varges, Emerging International Indicators for Compliance Function
Expectations, LexisNexis, 2010 Emerging Issues 4906 (Mar. 2010), at 2–3.
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structures that reward accomplishing short-term goals, like the
successful negotiation of a deal or the execution of an asset transfer,
can create perverse incentives for managers.39 In-house counsel,
however, are not subject to the same incentives as managers because
their compensation is typically not linked to transactional volume or
quantitative performance measures. To that extent, they serve as a
counterweight to managers, guarding against short-term myopia as part
of their preventive role.40
External factors also make the anticipatory and preventive
functions of in-house counsel increasingly important. The increasing
scope and complexity of business regulation necessitates vigilance by
in-house counsel to guide corporate management through a forest of
legal regimes and regulations.41 In-house counsel are also increasingly
conscious of the reputational harm their companies can suffer as a
result of legal problems.42
As our analysis next shows, if in-house counsel serve special
anticipatory and preventive functions within their clients,43 they

39.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of
Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 460 (2009). For

example, financial firms using the value-at-risk model offered bonuses to secondary
managers whose transactions were profitable and low in risk. Id. This incentivized
some managers to offset risk with credit default swaps and other hedging devices with
low probabilities of failure, but high costs in the event of default. Id.
40.
Varges observes that in-house counsel sometimes are still rewarded based
in part on the completion of transactions. Varges E-mail, supra note 32. He also
observes, in arguing for better internal company oversight of compensation systems,
that “[o]ne of the most striking features of the recent financial crisis was the near total
absence of evidence of control functions playing a material role in their companies’
remuneration systems.” Gabe Shawn Varges, Governing Remuneration, in
SCHWEIZERISHCE BANKRECHTSTAGUNG 2011: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 49, 72 (Susan
Emmenegger
ed.,
2011),
available
at
http://www.ibr.unibe.ch/unibe/
rechtswissenschaft/ibr/content/e8891/e8893/e10096/files10105/SBT11_TB_Inhalt_defin
itiv_rk.pdf.
41.
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 31, at 284; Simmons & Dinnage, supra note
31, at 99–106.
See Gruner, supra note 31, at 1119.
42.
43.
At least one prominent observer strongly argues that in-house counsel
should do their best to forecast legal trends and incorporate those trends into a client
company’s strategic business planning:
[T]he corporate counsel must be a futurist, a seer. Counsel must use his
legal foresight to discern trends in the law and to predict how those trends
will impact the company’s business over time. Understanding legal trends,
however, is not enough; the lawyer must also understand business dynamics
and societal demographics. . .. The forward-looking corporate counsel who
identifies trends, evaluates the likelihood of occurrence, devises legal
solutions to probable changes, and alerts management to the changes for
purposes of devising business strategies in response to them will make a key
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certainly should have tried, at least as an aspirational goal, to alert their
clients to the mortgage-note controversy and its potential reputational
and litigation costs—assuming they were able to foresee the
controversy.44 First, however, we should consider whether in-house
counsel had any obligations under existing professional standards.
Under those standards, lawyers, including in-house counsel, are
expected to render “competent” services with the “legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”45 They can fulfill this duty by advising their client in
good faith after making reasonable efforts to research a given issue.46
But the duty to be proactive, according to the ABA’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, is generally limited to actions needed to prevent
harmful violations of legal obligations to the client or violations of the
law:

contribution to the future economic health and well-being of a business
entity.
Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1208–
09 (1997). Although in-house counsel’s unique informational and organizational locus
offers opportunities to proactively manage a client’s legal problems, it also presents
unique conflicts that call into question the extent to which in-house counsel should
embrace preventive law practice. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of
General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 965–66 (2005). Exposure to information
“back-channel[s]” not available to outside counsel could put in-house counsel in a
position “that may require uncomfortable choices.” Id. at 966 (quoting Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1018
(1997) (using the term “water cooler” to describe spaces where “back-channel
information, office gossip, rumors and portents of future corporate undertakings” may
be exchanged)). Moreover, attorneys that implement and oversee compliance programs
at a company may be faced with an ethical challenge when called upon to defend
corporate actions in their role as advocates. Id. at 965–66. Sung Hui Kim draws
extensively on psychological research to explain that in-house counsel’s employee
status, professional role as an agent of the corporation, and desire to be team-players
may explain their apparent inability or unwillingness to prevent corporate fraud. Sung
Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1001–34 (2005). These observers raise some troubling
questions about the ability of in-house counsel to effectively fulfill a preventive role,
but their inquiries are chiefly directed at preventing corporate malfeasance and fraud.
Because their unique position specially equips in-house counsel to act preventively, at
the very least with respect to mundane legal risks, they should attempt to offer
anticipatory guidance to their employees with a healthy understanding of their limits as
“seers.”
44.
See infra notes 73–78 and accompanying text (examining whether in-house
counsel should have been able to foresee the mortgage-note controversy).
45.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002); see also 7 AM. JUR. 2D
Attorneys at Law § 203 (2007).
46.
See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 203 (2007).
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If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer,
employee or other person associated with the organization is
engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter
related to the representation that is a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then
the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best
interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably
believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the
organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to
higher authority in the organization . . ..47

In-house counsel considering the need for physical delivery and
indorsement of mortgage notes in securitization transactions could well
have determined in good faith that the delivery instructions were
intended to be protective and thus did not, at least per se, cause any
harmful violations of legal obligations to the client or any violations of
the law.48 And even if in-house counsel determined that a legal
obligation might have been violated, the ability to cure makes it
uncertain that a violation would be “likely to result in substantial
injury” to the client.49 Thus, under existing professional standards, it
appears that in-house counsel were not obligated to alert their clients to
the mortgage-note controversy and its potential reputational and
litigation costs.50

47.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2011).
48.
See supra Part III.A.
49.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2011). Because failure
to deliver the notes to the SPV could jeopardize the ability of that entity to enforce the
notes if a third-party gained possession of the instruments, in-house counsel to clients
who invest in MBS likely had a duty to advise clients on the significance of the delivery
instructions and indorsements. However, beyond rendering such advice, the lawyers’
responsibilities would be limited both formally by the scope of the rules and practically
by their limited ability to monitor third-parties to a transaction. Indeed, on the investor
side of such transactions, in-house counsel’s organizational and informational
advantages are effectively negated because the compliance obligations rest with other
parties to the transaction or even third-parties.
50.
Varges observes that these existing professional standards, which he refers
to as the “advisory model of lawyering,” are generally consistent with professional
standards internationally. Varges E-Mail, supra note 32. Furthermore, although the
advisory model serves companies well for the provision of normal in-house legal
services, Varges argues that it is less apt for a more preventive role. Id. He advocates
for companies using compliance officers who can operate beyond this model to engage
in more preventive activities and who are better positioned to challenge management on
matters that, although legal, may be inconsistent with the company’s values or represent
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If in-house counsel learned that delivery instructions were not
being complied with, they nonetheless might have wished to bring that
lapse to the attention of their corporate client. The extent to which they
should urge the client to comply would be a matter of judgment,
however, balancing the legal risk from non-compliance (which would,
as discussed, have appeared remote before the crisis) against the
potential to be perceived as obstructing transactions and imposing
needless expense.51 Lawyers faced with this balancing should try to
avoid achieving a Pyrrhic victory—ensuring compliance with the
delivery instructions but undercutting their authority to tackle future
issues by eroding management’s trust in their judgment and
performance.52
Some observers suggest that corporate attorneys, including inhouse counsel, should also adhere to a higher standard of care
commensurate with their specialized technical knowledge and ability to
forestall legal problems, and that such duty should extend to the
public—including public financial markets. Professor John Coffee, for
instance, argues that in-house counsel and other corporate attorneys
should act as “gatekeepers” in some circumstances,53 using their critical
position within an organization to prevent wrong-doing and serving as
“reputational intermediar[ies],” offering markets tacit information
about the quality of a corporation or its securities.54 In this role,
corporate lawyers would benefit not only their client, but also thirda reputational risk. See generally Varges, Compliance Side, supra note 38. To that end,
we next discuss more normative approaches to in-house counsel responsibilities.
51.
And of course in-house counsel’s answer might change as they learned
both the extent and costs of non-compliance as the crisis developed.
52.
It is important to correctly choose whom to report to within the client
company; because secondary managers may be conflicted, see supra note 39 and
accompanying text, in-house counsel can face a reporting-up problem, Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Role of Lawyers in the Global Financial Crisis, 24 AUSTL. J. CORP. L.
214, 220 (2010) (observing that since the duties of corporate lawyers are to the
organization as client under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.13, such
lawyers should report to the senior managers and directors who are better incentivized
to act on behalf of the company as a whole).
53.
COFFEE, supra note 31, at 2. Reinier Kraakman developed the concept of
gatekeepers by considering when liability should be imposed on third-parties who failed
to prevent misconduct they could have disrupted by failing to cooperate with
wrongdoers; usually by withholding specialized, professional services. See generally
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
54.
COFFEE, supra note 31, at 2. In the legal services context, reputational
effects are often considered less directly applicable to in-house counsel themselves than
to the outside law firms that clients retain for transactions and other matters. See Steven
L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J.
CORP. L. 497, 510–12 (2008). Empirical data cast some doubt on this assumption, but
are not definitive. Id. at 519–22.
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party investors who rely on an assumption that companies act on the
basis of quality professional advice to minimize their legal risk.55 Inhouse counsel are specially equipped to fill this role by virtue of their
access to information about the client and their familiarity with its
organization and its business practices.56 The gatekeeper role implies
special responsibilities for corporate and in-house counsel beyond the
zealous advocacy for one’s client expected of litigators.57
Judge E. Norman Veasey and Christine Di Guglielmo further
argue for a “persuasive counselor” model,58 in which lawyers,
especially in-house counsel,59 should “affirmatively, proactively, and
courageously try to persuade their clients to follow the law, to go
beyond mere compliance with the law, and even to ‘do the right thing’
55.
COFFEE, supra note 31, at 2–5. One scholar has recently developed a
theory that raises questions about the efficacy of gatekeepers in some circumstances,
arguing that financial transaction failures can result from a “multiple gatekeeper
phenomenon.” Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1585
(2010) (introducing this term). Because of the multitude of professionals—he focuses on
lawyers—involved in complex financial transactions, any given professional has an
incentive to minimize his role. Id. at 1603; see also Bevis Longstreth, Corporate Law:
Problems in the Corporate Bar (As It Appears to a Retired Practitioner), MONT. LAW.,
Feb. 2006, at 22, 23 (discussing practitioners’ tendency to narrow their vision “to avoid
the difficulty of having to say ‘no’” to a client); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1166–72, 1231–32, 1246–48 (2005) (discussing lawyers
hiding in the shadows of the divisions of responsibility). He also argues that the
multiple gatekeeper phenomenon allows clients to position themselves between
gatekeepers so that no party has complete knowledge of transactions. Tuch, supra, at
1603–04 (discussing the merger of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch as an
illustration of this concern). Although that argument incongruously assumes that the
companies themselves wish to court failure, it might have some explanatory power in a
fraud. That argument, however, fails to resolve, at least in the context of legal
gatekeepers, why in-house counsel do not fill the gap of outside counsel as gatekeepers.
Indeed, in-house counsel should be positioned to see the totality of a transaction and
prevent their corporate clients from exploiting gaps between gatekeepers. See infra
notes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing the need for in-house counsel to have
full access to information about a client’s business and transactions).
56.
See COFFEE, supra note 31, at 195.
57.
See id. at 193. Coffee recognizes difficulties in applying the gatekeeper
role to attorneys, such as the inherently imprecise nature of legal opinions, conflicts
with lawyers’ advocacy role, and the possible chilling effect on attorney-client
communications. John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge
of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 353 (2004). However, Coffee
believes reform can overcome such barriers to make lawyers effective gatekeepers
where warranted. Id. at 354–55.
58.
E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses,
and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1,
30 (2006).
59.
See id. at 29 (explaining that post-Enron concerns that lawyers were not
effectively policing their business and accounting clients were directed at in-house
corporate counsel in particular).
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from a moral or ethical perspective.”60 Similarly, Professor Robert
Rosen argues that in-house counsel should “maintain and condition
managerial discretion” while “convinc[ing] others about what is in their
own and the corporate interest.”61 This model is consistent with added
responsibility for in-house counsel based on their superior information
and influence within an organization, but stops short of recognizing a
special role for corporate lawyers in protecting the interests of thirdparty investors.62
The gatekeeper and persuasive counselor models63 establish
potential normative frameworks in which to assess what in-house

60.
Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 58, at 30 (emphasis added). The idea
that in-house counsel should act as “statesman adviser[s],” guiding their clients around
legal problems and protecting the clients’ long-term interests, has deep roots in the
American legal tradition, but truly came into its own after the Second World War. See
Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counsel after Enron, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1207–09 (2003) (describing the history of the lawyer-as-counselor
idea and advent of a theoretical underpinning for it by scholars such as “Lon Fuller,
Willard Hurst, Hart and Sacks, and Beryl Harold Levy”).
61.
Rosen, supra note 31, at 524. Rosen continues:
Practicing preventive law thus requires judgment about the corporate
processes in which expectations about managerial actions are managed. It
requires engaging managers, not as an executive with veto power, but as a
manager among others. The practice of preventive law thus requires a
willingness to alter one's own expectations and work in a process that the
lawyer cannot control. Outside counsel are not employed because they
cannot acquire the necessary convergent expectations and customize their
work to match and develop corporate commitments to legal compliance as
efficiently as inside counsel.
Id. (footnote omitted).
62.
See id. at 524–27; see also Gordon, supra note 60, at 1211 (“The notion
that the counselor's role has to be consistent with the law's public purposes . . .does not
mean that she must become an informer or enforcement officer. . .. She is perfectly
entitled to present an innovative view of the law and facts that favor what her client
wants to do, so long as it is a view that she thinks a judge or other competent lawmaker would actually be likely to accept.”). Gordon goes further than Veasey, Di
Guglielmo, and Rosen by suggesting that “Independent Counselor[s]” be created to
serve corporate clients under distinct ethical and professional responsibilities
commensurate with their function. Id. at 1210. Professor Gordon’s intriguing
suggestion is beyond the scope of this paper, but his description of the independent
counselor’s role works quite well as an aspirational archetype for how “persuasive
counselors” might practice within a company.
63.
Interestingly, these theoretical constructions of the in-house counsel role
are paralleled by sociological research carried out by Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 37.
The authors surveyed a number of in-house counsel to determine how they constructed
their own role within a company and from there constructed three “ideal types”: the
“cop” (who primarily policies actors within the organization), the “counsel” (who
mostly acts in an advisory capacity, blending business and legal advice), and the
“entrepreneur” (who views legal advice as another source of potential value creation
for the company). Id. at 462–68. While the overlap between the ideal types and the
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counsel’s standard of care should be. Gatekeepers, perceiving an
obligation to the public beyond that to their client,64 should scrutinize
mortgage-securitization transactions not only for conformity with the
legal obligations of their clients but also for the potential of legal
failures to impact financial markets.65 Persuasive counselors should
affirmatively and proactively watch out for the client’s interest.66
Whichever overarching theoretical framework is applied, lawyers,
including in-house counsel, in practice have to decide how to advise
their clients on legal risk by exercising their professional judgment
under conditions of uncertainty and in the face of multiple variables.67
Under the gatekeeper model, counsel would have to exercise this
judgment by taking into account not only their clients but also the
public, including possible costs to financial markets. Any such exercise
of judgment would necessarily be highly subjective.68 To attempt to
theoretical frameworks is not perfect, see id. at 470–71, the similarities between the
two sets of models is striking.
64.
There is a long history of contentious debate surrounding the extent to
which lawyers owe duties to the larger public; for a summary of this debate, see Steven
L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 14–17 (2005). Where lawyers encounter intrinsically unlawful transactions,
it is reasonable to suppose they have a duty to protect the public from the negative
externalities that could result. See id. at 24–25. However, imposing broader duties to
the public could force lawyers to second-guess the business decisions of their clients; a
role for which they generally lack adequate information and training. See id. at 29.
Although in-house counsel might be better-positioned to make these judgments given
their knowledge of the client company, creating dual obligations for in-house counsel
would still likely create inefficiencies and allow lawyers to use ill-defined duties to
“pursue their own ideological goals in favor of client interests.” Sean J. Griffith,
Afterward and Comment: Towards an Ethical Duty to Market Investors, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 1223, 1234 n.43 (2003).
65.
See Coffee, supra note 57, at 360–61 (explaining that what sets attorneys
as gatekeepers apart from advocates are “(1) a need for greater independence from the
client; (2) a recognition of a duty to the public; and (3) professional skepticism”).
66.
One observer even suggests that American in-house counsel, in particular,
tend to be more proactive as a result of their emergence from a culture that encourages
entrepreneurialism, that values lawyers as business, political, and civic leaders, and that
makes use of a distinctive adversarial legal system. Mary C. Daly, The Cultural,

Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global Organization: The Role of the
General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1068–78 (1997).
67.
See Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
367, 368–69 (2009) (describing law practice as, in part, an exercise in “risk
management” rather than an exact, predictive science).
68.
One of us thus observes that, in practice, because in-house counsel’s
direct responsibility to the public is limited to that imposed by law and the rules of
ethics, it might be useful to begin thinking of this wider obligation as indirect: counsel
has, of course, a direct fiduciary obligation to their corporate client, but that client also
has responsibilities to the public to comply with the law and even to be a good
“corporate citizen.” In-house counsel’s role, then, includes a fiduciary obligation to
help the corporation define as well as fulfill those responsibilities. Kathleen Cully,
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provide some guidance, Professor Richard Gruner, a former in-house
counsel for IBM, proposes factors that in-house counsel should consider
in determining how much information their corporate clients need to
make an informed decision on a legal issue.69 These factors include the
“diversity [i.e., multitude70] of parties” implicated in a legal issue, the
specific nature and scope of the legal requirements faced by the
corporate actor, and the “duration of the . . .impact” of the corporate
decision.71
Consider how the gatekeeper and persuasive counselor models, as
informed by Gruner’s factors, could inform the mortgage-note
controversy. The first question is whether in-house counsel, even under
those models, should or even could have foreseen the mortgage-note
controversy. Business managers face substantial time and information
constraints in their decision-making; therefore their legal information
needs increase with the amount of legal uncertainty and risk entailed in
a given decision.72 But it is doubtful that in-house counsel could have
foreseen the mortgage-note controversy or should have recognized the
Statement at University of Wisconsin Law Review Symposium: Who’s in the House?
The Changing Role and Nature of In-House and General Counsel (Nov. 18, 2011).
69.
Richard Gruner, Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Counsel: An
Information Processing Analysis, 9 J. CORP. L. 217, 228–29 (1984). This framework is
one way to conceptualize the cost-benefit analysis faced by in-house counsel, but there
are other methods that could be employed to weigh the probability and magnitude of
legal risk. In the litigation context, models analyzing the trade-offs faced by litigants
have employed traditional cost-benefit techniques with discounted cash flow analysis,
see, e.g., John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279
(1973); Steven Shavell, Suit Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982),
game-theoretic models, see, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement
under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984); I. P. L. P’ng, Strategic
Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539 (1983), and real options
pricing models, see, e.g., Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing
Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990); Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang,
The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1267 (2006).
70.
Gruner, supra note 69, at 228 (explaining that legal risk increases with the
number and variety of parties affected by a company’s decision since each represents a
potential source of liability).
71.
Id. at 228–29.
72.
Id. at 229.
When these factors cause uncertainty about legal restrictions to be high,
corporate decision makers must either obtain the information necessary to
reduce their legal uncertainty, or accept the substantial risk that a chosen
course of action will not comply with legal requirements. The greater the
legal uncertainty associated with a particular decision, the more information
that must be processed to allow the decision to be made in a legally prudent
manner.
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alleged legal uncertainty at the heart of the controversy. Mortgagesecuritization transactions were long considered standard, low-risk
financial transactions73 and would not, by themselves, have raised
inferences of legal uncertainty or risk. And the structural risk was
further reduced in 2001, when the UCC was amended to make it clear
that the sale of promissory notes could be effected merely by the seller
signing a sale agreement describing the notes.74
Even though compliance with the delivery instructions would
increase the SPV’s level of protection against possible third parties who
might gain possession of the notes and would also facilitate enforcement
of the notes,75 the decision as to when, and whether, to enforce the
delivery instructions reflects a business risk. In-house counsel would
perform even their normative duties under these models by notifying
the client of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of nonpossession. The fact that compliance with the delivery instructions
would be needed to enforce the notes should not have been problematic;
such instructions could later be complied with as to notes that need to
be enforced. Thus, even if one assumes that in-house counsel are
responsible for post-hoc monitoring of transactions after the closing,76
the fact that the delivery instructions were not initially complied with
would not necessarily have been a red flag signaling wrongdoing or
error.77
The second question assumes in-house counsel could have foreseen
the possibility of the mortgage-note controversy and asks what in-house
counsel should have done about it. Although mortgage-securitization
transactions were of relatively long duration and were engaged in by a
multitude of parties with large amounts of money at stake, there seemed
to be little or no litigation risk because the transactions appeared to be
(and indeed likely were) in compliance with applicable law. Any
litigation that might subsequently be commenced would therefore likely
be viewed, at that time, as extremely unlikely to succeed. There
remains, however, a question as to whether in-house counsel should
have anticipated the extent to which the mortgage-note controversy
might become a matter of public interest or be politicized.

73.
Daniel J. McDonald & Daniel L. Thornton, A Primer on the Mortgage
Market and Mortgage Finance, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV., Jan./Feb. 2008, at 31,
36.
74.
See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
75.
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
76.
For a discussion of whether in-house counsel should be responsible for
post-hoc monitoring, see infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
77.
Indeed, it appears that, in at least some mortgage-securitization
transactions, the notes may not have been physically delivered. See supra note 14.
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In answering this question, it is important to recognize that the vast
majority of mortgage-securitization transactions were executed prior to
housing prices plummeting in late 2007.78 Only thereafter did the trickle
of mortgage-related lawsuits become a torrent and mortgagesecuritization transactions suffer billions of dollars in losses,79 creating
a much more serious problem.80 Prior to that dramatic shift in the
financial and political landscape, the specter of claims based on the
failure to physically deliver mortgage notes might well have been
judged chimerical. Likewise, the idea that such claims would gain
substantial political traction and prompt a public controversy that would
itself drain a client’s goodwill and resources would have appeared
highly unlikely.81
It therefore appears, even under the gatekeeper and persuasive
counselor models as informed by Gruner’s factors, that in the unlikely
event in-house counsel had foreseen the possibility of the mortgage-note
controversy, such counsel should have had no duty to do anything about
it other than perhaps to include that possibility when informing the
client of possible consequences of non-possession. An in-house counsel
might also have decided to alert the client to the possibility, albeit
remote, that arguments might be politicized. Even breach of a mere
technicality can engender strategic litigation under the right
circumstances,82 and “early interception of . . .[a problem] is much
78.
See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, HOUSING AND MORTGAGE MARKETS IN
2010,
at
36
(2011),
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/21846/
MMErevised81011.pdf (observing that private-label MBS issuance peaked in 2005 at
about $1.2 trillion while issuance in 2010 was only about $60 billion, with similarly
diminished quantities issued in 2008 and 2009).
79.
See, e.g., Kerry E. Grace, Moody’s Raises Estimate for Subprime
Losses, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2009, at C3; Yalman Onaran, Banks’ Subprime Losses
Top $500 Billion on Writedowns, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 12, 2008),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8sW0n1Cs1tY&refer
=home.
80.
Monica Pinciak-Madden & Katya Jestin, Subprime Crisis: The Unraveling
Promises to Increase the Number of Civil Suits and Criminal Investigations, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 5, 2009, available at http://www.jenner.com/system/assets/assets/2527/
original/NYLJ_Jestin_Pinciak_Madden.pdf?1319122463 (noting that more than half of
the 800 subprime-related lawsuits initiated since 2006 were filed in 2008).
81.
This paragraph notes an important distinction between the foreseeability of
a possible legal argument by claimants and an economic and political environment in
which such claims might be more enduring. Whether and to what extent in-house
counsel are equipped to forecast the “social, economic, and political factors” that
impact different areas of law, as some suggest they should, Liggio, supra note 43, at
1209, is an open question. Certainly the skills required to make such predictions are not
usually part of the typical training and education of contemporary lawyers.
82.
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional
Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 496–97 (2007) (citing survey and anecdotal
evidence supporting the assertion that money disputes frequently lead to litigation,
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easier than cleaning up a mess after the fact”83—a mess that
increasingly includes reputational harm.84 Although there are few
objective standards to determine, in the abstract, what conduct makes a
“great” as opposed to a merely “competent” attorney, lawyers,
including in-house counsel, ideally should strive to serve their clients in
a manner that exceeds the metes and bounds of their bare obligations.
Consider next, more generally, the extent to which in-house
counsel should be responsible for post hoc monitoring of transactions
after the closing. In-house counsel have limited time and resources to
bring to bear on problems,85 so they naturally should focus on the more
important problems that their skills and expertise can help resolve.
Unless in-house lawyers had reason to believe that delivery instructions
were inappropriately not being followed,86 monitoring the transfer of
assets sold after an agreement was entered into would not be among
their priorities. Nor should it have been, given the standardized nature
of the transactions involved.87
In-house counsel should be entitled to presume, absent becoming
aware of evidence suggesting otherwise, that their clients will act
rationally. Any other approach would not only be inefficient but would
risk putting counsel into an adversarial relationship with the client.

D. What, If Anything, Could In-house Counsel Have Done to Mitigate
the Mortgage-Note Controversy?
We next consider what in-house counsel of clients structuring or
investing in mortgage-securitization transactions could have done to
mitigate some of the impact of the mortgage-note controversy, once that
controversy became apparent. To what extent, for example, could inhouse counsel have acted aggressively to identify possible hostile legal
claims and to offer competing narratives to contrast with the mortgagefraud account that helped generate the underlying controversy?
In-house counsel could have done a lot to mitigate the controversy.
In-house counsel generally have access to information about their
regardless of contract terms, and that a key responsibility of lawyers as contract
drafters is to provide a roadmap for parties to follow in a dispute).
83.
Hazard, supra note 43, at 1021.
84.
Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 31, at 128, 139–40.
85.
Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 37, at 472 (explaining that in-house counsel
surveyed in their study frequently operate under the dual constraints of limited
resources and profit pressures).
86.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2011).
87.
U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (1998). For a discussion of what steps in-house
counsel could have taken to mitigate the mortgage-note controversy, once they learned
of it, see infra Part III.D.
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client’s contracts, business operations, and compliance documents,
especially if such counsel cultivates a good working relationship with
senior executives.88
Better policies and procedures might have helped to mitigate the
mortgage-note controversy. Survey data from before and after the 2008
financial crisis suggest that many corporate directors believed their
companies either lacked risk-management programs or doubted the
efficacy of systems that were in place.89 In-house counsel might have
been able to offer more systematic guidelines for future MBS contract
performance and compliance, clarifying the options. Any such
guidelines would need to carefully instruct the operational employees to
avoid the risk that old procedures would continue to be followed or that
new procedures would be adopted for old transactions. In-house
counsel should also avoid drafting guidelines that might be argued to
constitute recognition of errors under prior procedures.90
These guidelines might have featured management education,
internal reports, and protocols for investigation.91 In crafting the
guidelines, in-house counsel need not act alone. Industry associations
and outside counsel are valuable sources of specialized expertise that inhouse counsel can draw on in crafting a compliance system. For
instance, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA) and the American Securitization Forum publish a variety of
guidelines and best practices that offer useful foundations for
compliance programs.92 In industries like real estate securitization
where actors face similar risks and use similar business models,

88.
See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 31, at 113 (suggesting that in-house
counsel “should have the opportunity to be part of the management team”).
89.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34
J. CORP. L. 967, 970–71 (2009) (referencing a pre-crisis survey indicating forty-three
percent of respondents doubted the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies or had not
implemented them and also a 2008 survey in which more than seventy percent of
respondents were concerned about their companies’ approach to risk management.)
90.
The best-case scenario for MBS issuers would have been to redraft
standard PSAs immediately after the 2001 revision of Article 9 of the UCC since this
would justify a change in delivery instructions as merely aligning them with the
redrafted code.
91.
See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 31, at 118.
92.
Housing Finance and Securitization Resource Center, SIFMA, http://
www.sifma.org/issues/capital-markets/securitization/housing-finance-and
securitization/resources/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2011); Market Standards & Practices, AM.
SECURITIZATION
F.,
http://www.americansecuritization.com/
hub.aspx?catid=19&mainid=5 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
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external coordination can ease the burden on in-house counsel seeking
to establish a compliance regime for their client-company.93
After establishing guidelines, in-house counsel could have built a
system for monitoring compliance. Monitoring efforts would
necessarily have been constrained by the limited time and resources of
in-house counsel.94 Nonetheless, a monthly spot-check of some
representative transactions may well have been prudent.
Of course, even the best compliance program will be of limited
effectiveness if the client’s employees are ignorant of its major
components.95 In-house counsel could have designed and implemented
internal management training programs. Effective compliance education
can also include non-legal staff in order to offset the limited resources
of in-house legal departments.96
When faced with an unexpected legal challenge outside their
routine practice, in-house counsel often find it efficient to turn to
outside lawyers for assistance.97 Confronted with the mortgage-note
controversy, in-house counsel therefore could have retained outside
counsel to help assess the strengths of potential claims and reputational
damage, and to consider appropriate legal responses.98 Outside counsel
would be especially helpful if, for example, management conflicts were
part of the reason for lapses leading to the controversy.99 Perhaps also
93.
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 31, at 285–86 (noting that a “programmatic
approach” to preventing legal problems is well-suited to repetitive transactions such as
financings).
94.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
95.
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 31, at 284.
96.
Id. at 286.
97.
Id. at 289–90; see also Schwarcz, supra note 54, at 507 (discussing the
economies of scale offered by outside counsel when a company engages in non-standard
or particularly large transactions). Outside counsel can also help by increasing
objectivity. Cf. DeMott, supra note 43, at 968–69 (questioning the ability of in-house
counsel to objectively assess policies and decisions they participated in making).
98.
See Schwarcz, supra note 54, at 507 (discussing the economies of scale
offered by outside counsel when a client company engages in non-standard or
particularly large transactions). In-house counsel’s supervision of the outside lawyers
auditing the client-firm would have to be strictly limited in scope since an audit would
almost certainly implicate some decisions made by in-house counsel themselves. See
DeMott, supra note 43, at 972. Where a potential conflict exists between in-house and
outside counsel, the latter should fully investigate the question autonomously before
revealing their findings to the client and its in-house legal team. However, absent
indications of outright fraud or illegality, such conflicts pose less of a problem, and
coordination between in-house and outside counsel auditing mortgage securitization
firms would likely have been helpful, on balance.
99.
Cf. Sally R. Weaver, Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A
Structural and Contextual Analysis, 46 EMORY L.J. 1023, 1045 (1997) (suggesting inhouse counsel look to outside representation where there is a potential conflict between
management and the interests of the company).
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with the help of outside counsel, in-house counsel could have reviewed
their client’s mortgage-securitization transactions to look for any
irregularities.
Finally, in-house counsel could have been more aggressive in
publicly countering the claims of critics who alleged that certain
mortgage-securitization transactions were illegitimate. To a large
extent, the mortgage-note controversy is a product of the economic and
political climate produced by the 2008 financial crisis. In-house counsel
could have offered a narrative different than mortgage fraud to help
shape the context in which claims against their clients would be
considered.100 Accurate information is critical because:
[The media] will hop on anything. And the people who are
assigned are . . .not financial journalists. So many of them
don’t have a background and don’t really frankly know what
it is they’re writing about. They don’t really frankly
understand those stories that they are writing, and they get
things wrong very frequently; like very, very
frequently . . .and maybe not wrong enough that it has to be
retracted, but wrong enough that it creates a misleading
impression, sometimes on purpose and sometimes by
accident.101
To this end, it is becoming increasingly routine for in-house
counsel to large companies, in coordination with management, to help
develop talking points, press releases, and, more broadly, a strategy for
engaging with critics in the media.102
In helping to shape the public narrative, in-house counsel must
often share privileged and confidential information with public-relations
staff and even outside consultants.103 Communications with outsiders
should be treated carefully because the privileged status of information
100. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion,
Installment One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1259, 1270–73 (2009) (examining how public discussion can impact future
claims and regulatory actions). Beardslee surveyed and interviewed a number of general
counsel to S&P 500 companies as well as public-relations professionals to gain insight
into how in-house counsel help to shape the public image of their client companies. Id.
at 1264–65.
101. Id. at 1280–81 (quoting Interview by Michelle Stefano Beardslee, with #2,
General Counsel, Investment Bank (Feb. 4, 2008), at 13) (articulating a common
refrain among corporate counsel and public-relations professionals).
102. Id. at 1295.
103. Id. at 1289–90.
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is sometimes uncertain and highly context-dependent.104 Similarly,
documents produced in collaboration with outside consultants might not
be subject to work-product protection, even when such documents
discuss possible claims against the client company.105 In-house counsel
should also carefully monitor public statements to avoid disclosing
details of pending or potential legal claims and to ensure that any public
commentary is grounded in good faith legal analysis.
It should not be beyond the scope of in-house counsels’ role to
occasionally represent a client’s view to the public, so long as in-house
counsel first vets that view with the client. In-house counsel also could
coordinate with industry or trade groups that can act as surrogates in
public discourse, in order to put forth arguments that such counsel or
their clients might not feel comfortable making individually.106
CONCLUSION
Analyzing in-house counsel’s role and responsibility in light of the
mortgage-note controversy reveals the constraints under which in-house
lawyers work while managing legal risk for their clients. Although inhouse counsel are dedicated to a single client-company, are strategically
positioned to understand the full scope of that company’s operations,
and are privy to superior networks of information—all of which allow
them to act preventively—there are some issues that cannot be foreseen.
Novel claims of questionable merit, like the A-B-C-D theory we assess
above, are likely beyond the ambit of even skilled attorneys. Even if
one assumes a high aspirational standard of care like that encompassed
in the gatekeeper model,107 in-house counsel probably could not have
104. See Ann M. Murphy, Spin Control and the High-Profile Client—Should
the Attorney-Client Privilege Extend to Communications with Public Relations
Consultants?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 545, 570–78 (2005).
105. See Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business out of Work
Product, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1869, 1929 (2011).
106. See, e.g., SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, SIFMA Q&A REGARDING
MORTGAGE LOAN TRANSFERS AND SECURITIZATION (2010), available at http://

www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/issues/capital_markets/securitization/securitization/sifma
%20mortgage%20transfer%20and%20securitization%20question%20and%20answers.p
df.
107. In this context, it is also important to bear in mind that in-house counsel
are also in a uniquely difficult position. They are lawyers with only a single client and
should they be terminated by that client, they would likely find it extremely difficult to
obtain a new legal position. Cf. In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 829 F. Supp. 1176,
1189 (1993) (discussing the perceived conflict between a general counsel’s duty to a
client corporation’s shareholders and his financial dependence on the company’s
directors). In addition, courts are generally unwilling to provide legal recourse to
lawyers terminated for “whistleblowing” and other conduct mandated by ethical rules,
on the basis that such conduct is expected of all lawyers. See Weaver, supra note 99, at
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predicted the mortgage-note controversy before the financial crisis and,
accordingly, could not have been expected to warn clients about
potential claims therefrom.
More generally, in-house counsel work within budgetary and time
constraints, coupled with political realities. The role of in-house
counsel in particular circumstances is thus tempered by reality, taking
into account such factors as views of then-probable future events,
consequences, costs, internal dynamics, and personalities. This can
only be done case by case, guided of course by rules of ethics and law.
Subject to these constraints, in-house counsel not only help to
shape the corporate client’s policies to the public but also help the client
to meet its business targets while complying with law. Weighing these
competing and often incommensurable goals and strategies is extremely
challenging, especially given the likelihood that the actions of in-house
counsel will largely be judged in hindsight by people emphasizing
success over legal “technicalities” with which they are not familiar.

1028–29. Thus, in-house lawyers’ unique and strategic position serving a single client
also operates as a practical constraint on their ability to act preventively by policing the
client company.
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